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Abstract 
Confabulation is typically understood to be dysfunctional. But this 
understanding neglects the phenomenon's potential benefits. In 
fact, we think that the benefits of non-clinical confabulation provide 
a better foundation for a general account of confabulation. In this 
paper, we start from these benefits to develop a social teleological 
account of confabulation. Central to our account is the idea that 
confabulation manifests a kind of willful ignorance. By 
understanding confabulation in this way, we can provide 
principled explanations for the difference between clinical and non-
clinical cases of confabulation and the extent to which 
confabulation is rational. 
 
Keywords: Confabulation; Rationality; Clinical; Social Agency; 
Cognitive Bias; Willful Ignorance 
 
Introduction 
 
They say that not telling the truth is bad, especially in relationships. They say 
that trust is the foundation of a healthy romance. But what they say might only 
be half true. Healthy marriages and long-term relationships persist, in part, 
through confidentially endorsed idealizations. According to some studies, 
individuals greatly exaggerate the positive qualities of their romantic partners 
(Penton-Voak et al., 2007). Even starry-eyed optimists can concede that these 
people are not telling the whole truth. And yet couples self-report stronger 
feelings of being in love when they idealize their partner to some degree, even 
over the course of a long-term relationship (Miller et al. (2006)). 
 
When trust and honesty seem so important, why do people resort to stating 
falsehoods about their partners? And why do these false claims seem to work? 
They work because such idealizations are rational confabulations. Or so we will 
argue. 
 
Historically, confabulation was thought to be a clinical phenomenon. Some 
individuals would sincerely assert absurd claims that directly conflicted with the 
obvious. A right-hemisphere stroke patient, for instance, would report that their 
left index finger was pointed at the doctor’s nose even though the patient’s hand 
lay motionless (Ramachandran, 1996). But individuals without any apparent 
psychological or neurobiological impairment also seem to confabulate. One 
study had individuals compare the quality of identical pairs of nylon stocking 
pantyhose (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson & Nisbett, 1978). Most participants 
rated the right-most pair as most preferable. When asked to defend this selection, 
many insisted they based their decision on that pair’s superior quality, even 
though the only noticeable difference between the pairs was their relative 
position. 
 
Psychologists, psychiatrists, and philosophers try to specify what is common to 
these and other cases of confabulation along several dimensions. Some focus on 
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the causes of confabulation. Some focus on similarities in the content of 
confabulations. And some focus on the physiological correlates of confabulation. 
 
Many of these proposals presume that instances of clinical confabulation are 
paradigmatic of the phenomenon in general. The understanding of confabulation 
that emerges from this presumption is one where clinical cases command most 
attention. Because these cases are generally dysfunctional, the phenomenon of 
confabulation itself is seen as paradigmatically dysfunctional. 		
The psychological models that result from this understanding, however, do not 
reflect a unified conception of confabulation. For one, there are diverse 
neurobiological bases and physiological correlates of confabulation that crosscut 
its different manifestations (Bortolotti & Cox, 2009; Metcalf et al., 2007) and there 
appears to be no adequate content-based classification of confabulation 
(Coltheart, 2017). Moreover, dysfunctional accounts of confabulation have 
difficulty explaining the potential benefits of clinical confabulation (Bortolotti & 
Sullivan-Bissett, 2018). 
 
Some more recent work on confabulation shifts the focus to non-clinical 
confabulation and its benefits. Non-clinical confabulation seems somewhat 
common, and this calls into question the presumptive paradigmatic status of 
clinical confabulation. By taking non-clinical confabulation as paradigmatic, we 
can develop a better model of confabulation, one that explains the occurrence of 
everyday, non-clinical confabulation, but also explains the occurrence of 
confabulation in clinical settings. 
 
That is just what we will do in this paper. We begin with this alternative 
presumption, that non-clinical confabulation is paradigmatic. We then sketch a 
theory of confabulation on that basis. In particular, we start with the idea that 
non-clinical confabulation results from properly functioning cognitive 
mechanisms that contribute to achieving goods inherent to socially embedded 
agency. In this regard, our theory is teleological: it characterizes confabulation in 
terms of the functional role it must fulfill in order to facilitate the achievement of 
these goods.  
 
The inadequacy of existing proposals might lead some researchers to be 
pluralistic about confabulation. They might say that there are no generally 
informative conditions that jointly define the category and that what we call 
"confabulation" is, in reality, a disjunction of psychological phenomena 
connected only by superficial relations of similarity. We want to resist this 
temptation. Pluralism runs the risk of conflating confabulation with other kinds 
of irrational beliefs or delusions. Such conflations would make it more difficult to 
develop practically useful diagnostic conditions and remediation programs (see 
Bortolotti & Cox, 2009: 956). Beyond this, we believe there is a unified story to tell 
about confabulation. This unification is an important upshot of our teleological 
account of confabulation, though the proof will be in the pudding. 
 
Here’s the plan for what’s to follow. We first introduce the epistemic approach to 
confabulation and consider whether paradigmatic instances of confabulation are 
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dysfunctional. Then, to support our contention that paradigmatic instances of 
confabulation are not dysfunctional, we consider a recent proposal on its benefits 
(Bortolotti, 2018). Next, we argue that confabulation provides at least two 
socially oriented benefits: predictability and relational resilience. We use these 
benefits to develop a framework according to which confabulation manifests a 
kind of willful ignorance. Then, we apply our framework to explain the 
rationality of confabulation, provide a principled means of distinguishing 
between clinical and non-clinical cases of confabulation, and make concrete 
predictions about when confabulation is likely to occur. 
 
1. Extant Accounts of Confabulation		
In this section, we discuss some extant accounts of confabulation. We accept 
many elements of these accounts. But we also caution against some of their 
assumptions as well as their needless reliance on questionable empirical 
evidence. 
 
1.1 A Critique of Confabulation as a Dysfunction		
Confabulation was first discussed scientifically in the late nineteenth century, 
when the Russian psychiatrist Sergei Korsakoff began to document some odd 
patterns in his patients’ conditions. These patients suffered from persistent 
“illusions of memory”. One patient seemed to be unaware that she was ill, and 
even said that she went for a walk earlier despite her obvious immobility. 
Another patient seemed to completely fabricate a story about meeting a famous 
doctor the day before (Korsakoff, 1890). Subsequent research continued the 
theme of confabulation as a false memory disorder (see Schnider, 2017: ch. 2). 
Discussions were confined to clinical contexts and focused on persistent and 
fantastical confabulations in brain-damaged patients (Kopelman, 1987; 
Moscovitch, 1989). 
 
The overarching implication of this research program is that confabulation is 
dysfunctional. Confabulating patients state obviously false things when they 
should say true things. But they don’t even seem aware of the fact that they are 
stating obviously false things. Furthermore, the fact that patients consistently 
produce false memory reports supports the idea that confabulation results from 
malfunction. In light of this, many recent definitions of confabulation focus on 
false memories, neurobiological damage, or both (see Turner & Coltheart, 2010 
for overview). 
 
These accounts are instances of the two-factor theory of confabulation. Typically, 
a two-factor theory posits that confabulation arises from the interactions between 
two neurobiological factors. The first factor is damage to a perceptual or 
mnemonic process that produces ill-grounded (and often false) outputs. The 
second factor is damage to an executive monitoring process that would, when 
functioning correctly, manipulate and correct the outputs of the damaged 
perceptual or mnemonic process. Because the two-factor theory claims that 
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confabulation is the result of the interactions between damaged cognitive 
processes, it characterizes confabulation as dysfunctional. 
 
There are at least three serious issues with the presumption that confabulation is 
a clinical memory disorder that manifests as a persistent tendency to produce 
false memory reports.  
 
First, the content of a confabulation need not be false (see Bernecker, 2017). 
Sometimes an individual's confabulation merely misreports when an actual 
event happened (Borsutzsky et al., 2008). When asked, one Korsakoff patient said 
they spent last New Year’s Eve with their wife in a restaurant. They had in fact 
spent a New Year’s Eve in this way, but it was before the patient’s 
hospitalization. That being said, the extent to which a confabulation is true is 
beside the point. Imagine that you were a Capgras patient who claimed that your 
son had been replaced by an imposter. What you said would be a confabulation 
even if – somehow – the person before you really were an imposter! This is 
because you lack evidence of the replacement. Thus, whether some verbal report 
counts as confabulation depends on the justification of the report, not its truth-
value. 
 
Second, there is non-clinical confabulation. Consider, for example, Nisbett and 
Wilson’s aforementioned research on evaluations of consumer goods. 
Researchers asked participants to compare the quality of four identical pairs of 
nylon stocking pantyhose. A disproportionate number of participants chose the 
right-most pair. When asked, many participants denied that the relative position 
of the pairs of pantyhose played any role in which pair they chose. They insisted 
that the right-most pair appeared to be better. These individuals’ claims are 
importantly similar to those made by individuals in “paradigmatic” clinical cases 
of confabulation. It is unlikely, however, that underlying neurobiological 
damage explains confabulation in consumer choice studies. 
 
The third issue is that confabulation is not restricted to memory reports. In 
consumer choice cases, individuals supply reasons or justifications for their 
selections. These reasons probably do not match the reasons that actually 
motivated their behavior. But it would be misleading to say that these 
individuals are reporting a false memory of which reasons motivated their 
behavior. Rather, what they are doing is asserting that certain reasons (like 
superior quality) were motivating when those reasons probably were not 
motivating. This kind of confabulation is likely not restricted to artificially 
constructed studies of consumer behavior. Consider studies of bias in hiring 
decisions. When asked to evaluate identical resumes, individuals exhibit a 
preference for the resumes of people with white-sounding names over those with 
black-sounding names (King et al., 2006; Sullivan-Bissett, 2015). If they were 
asked to explain their decisions, they would likely claim that the differences were 
made on the basis of important, albeit small, differences in the candidates’ 
qualifications. But such an explanation is likely incorrect. Absent any real 
differences between candidates beyond race, it seems likely that race-based 
considerations motivated the decision rather than differences in qualification.  
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Reasons-based confabulation can also be found in clinical cases. Consider, for 
instance, visual anosognosia patients who deny their blindness (Celesia & 
Brigell, 2005). When these patients are asked to prove that they are not blind (or, 
at least, to explain why they fail to perform simple visual discrimination tasks), 
they will sometimes cite poor environmental conditions or a lack of interest in 
performing the task (Kaufman & Milstein, 2013). Confabulations that pertain to 
an individual’s reasons or justifications are rarely a matter of producing a false 
memory report.1 
 
In response to these and similar criticisms, some researchers have developed 
theories that focus on the epistemic features of confabulation. One influential 
epistemic account defines confabulation partly in terms of ill-grounded thought. 
According to William Hirstein, some individual, S, confabulates with respect to 
some claim, p, if and only if: 
 
1. S claims that p; 
2. S believes that p; 
3. S’s thought that p is ill-grounded; 
4. S does not know that their thought that p is ill-grounded; 
5. S should know that their thought that p is ill-grounded; 
6. S is confident that p.2 
 
Hirstein’s account entails that confabulation is dysfunctional insofar as it states 
that there is something the confabulating individual should do that they 
systematically fail to do.3 This straightforwardly explains why clinical cases of 
confabulation often manifest as false memory reports despite not consisting 
entirely of false memory reports. 
 
Hirstein’s account does not entail that confabulation manifests only in clinical 
contexts.4 It can also include both memory reports and justification reports as 
types of confabulation. According to his account, however, someone who 	
1
  Doris (2015: 141) also distinguishes between false memory reports and faulty justification 
reports. However, he calls these latter reports “rationalizations rather than confabulations, to 
distinguish them from the clinical phenomena” (2015: 141). We accept the distinction, but 
reject the implication that ‘confabulation’ refers exclusively to some clinical phenomenon. 
2
  Hirstein, 2005: 5. 
3
  To press this point, Hirstein also says: “Confabulation involves absence of doubt about 
something one should doubt…It is a sort of pathological certainty about ill-grounded thoughts 
and utterances” (2005: 4). Moreover, his account is rooted in the claim that confabulations 
results from frontal processes failing to operate properly (2005: 178). He takes this to be 
evidence that confabulation is a product of systematic failure. Finally, his sense of ‘should’ at 
issue is functional: “The use of ‘should’ here involves no more than the claim that an 
optimally functioning car should move down the road” (2005: 192).  
4
  Hirstein supports his account, however, with appeals to elements that make confabulation 
seem inherently clinical. Confabulation is persistent (or pathological), contra-functional, and 
grounded in neurological damage. 
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confabulates fails to know something that they should know. So, confabulation is 
dysfunctional by definition. Someone who confabulates fails to live up to certain 
epistemic norms. 
 
We take issue with this idea that confabulation is inherently (or 
paradigmatically) dysfunctional. We take issue with it because some research 
indicates that confabulations appear to be beneficial in both clinical (Bortolotti & 
Sullivan-Bissett, 2018) and non-clinical (Doris, 2015: ch. 6) contexts. This research 
calls into question the claim that confabulation is the result of an improperly or 
poorly functioning psychology. 		
In fact, we believe that confabulation is globally functional. We admit that the 
sorts of clinical cases that served as the historical origin of our understanding of 
confabulation are ones where the behavior is clearly dysfunctional. But it is a 
historical accident that such cases became the presumed paradigmatic instances 
of confabulation.5 
 
The appearance of inherent dysfunction arises from focusing on such instances of 
confabulation in overly narrow settings. To properly understand the global 
functionality of confabulation, we must see how confabulation fits into the wider 
tapestry of human agency. In particular, we must see how confabulation 
operates in non-clinical contexts. As the relationship benefits mentioned at the 
outset suggest, there are many cases where confabulation contributes to 
positively functioning agency.		
In line with what we have said here, some recent discussions have shed the 
presumption that confabulation is inherently dysfunctional by more carefully 
exploring its potential benefits. Coltheart (2017) discusses the possibility that 
confabulation results from the proper functioning of several cognitive processes. 
Sullivan-Bissett (2015: 555-57) argues that confabulation facilitates self-
understanding by explaining behavior in terms of justifiable patterns of reasons. 
Bortolotti (2018) has recently highlighted additional practical and epistemic 
benefits of confabulation. (In the next section, we summarize the main parts of 
her account before suggesting some extensions.) On these views, confabulation is 
not inherently dysfunctional. 
 
These accounts take the benefits of confabulation as central to constructing a 
theory of confabulation. We accept the central idea behind these alternatives, but 
we take issue with the specific claims they make about confabulation's benefits. 
In order to better situate our own account (in Sections 2 and 3), we will now 
evaluate these purported benefits. 
 
1.2 Bortolotti and the Agency-Enhancing Benefits of Confabulation 	
5
   As we explain below, confabulation typically does most of its work behind the scenes. The 
easiest exceptions to find lie in certain clinical settings where confabulation blatantly reveals 
itself. This might explain why the study of confabulation initially focused almost exclusively 
on clinical cases of it. We thank a reviewer for raising this point. 
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Bortolotti’s proposal regarding the benefits of confabulation rests on two claims: 
(i) certain factors threaten people’s sense of self-integrity, and (ii) these threats 
are compensated for by confabulation's ability to enhance agency and preserve a 
sense of self-integrity. Thus, confabulation has epistemic and practical benefits 
(Bortolotti, 2018: 243).  
 
Bortolotti discusses two potential threats to agency. The first comes from 
unconscious influences that seemingly drive a large amount of people’s thoughts 
and actions. The second threat comes from the lack of direct access people have 
to their unconscious behavioral influences. According to Bortolotti, these two 
threats cause people to systematically misidentify the motivating reasons for 
their actions (Bortolotti, 2018: 242). They also create conflicts for people’s 
intuitive sense of being competent, rational, and reasons-responsive (Bortolotti, 
2018: 241). As a result, these factors undermine self-integrity and agency.  
 
On Bortolotti’s view, these potential threats to agency are all mitigated by 
confabulation. In general, confabulation enhances agency by justifying behavior 
in ways that conform to an integrated self-image. Bortolotti (2018) identifies three 
specific benefits of confabulation: (1) the construction of a better self, (2) the 
integration of self-related information, and (3) the maintenance of the social self. 
Some of these benefits might have downstream motivational effects. One way for 
someone to maintain the social self is to conceive of themselves as a reasons-
responsive agent. Maintaining this self-conception might actually improve future 
reasons-responsiveness. Some benefits might also generate further epistemic 
benefits. By presenting themselves in a socially admirable light, a confabulating 
individual might improve their standing in a knowledge community and thereby 
make it easier to exchange information within that community. 
 
Bortolotti acknowledges that not confabulating – i.e., achieving maximal 
accuracy in the identification and communication of justification for thoughts 
and actions – might lead to a form of self-integration. If people did not 
confabulate, they might form an integrated conception of self that accurately 
represents their decision-making as someone who is subject to numerous 
unconscious influences. However, a more accurate self-image might not provide 
the motivational and epistemic benefits afforded by confabulation. As Bortolotti 
claims: 
 
A better-grounded or even accurate explanation [instead of 
confabulating] is unlikely to play self-enhancing and self-
integrating roles to the same extent as the rival [confabulating] 
explanation. Acknowledging that the consumer choice was not 
based on the quality of the items but on an unconscious tendency to 
favour items on the right-hand side may not support people’s sense 
that they are competent agents and decision makers, and may not 
help them identify patterns that contribute to their construction of a 
coherent image of themselves as discerning consumers (Bortolotti, 
2018: 244). 
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In short, then, the potential benefits of confabulation stem from the role 
confabulation plays in enhancing an individual’s agency in the face of numerous 
threats to an integrated sense of themselves as a rational actor.  
 
We think that Bortolotti's proposal makes important contributions to our 
understanding of confabulation's role in supporting and enhancing agency. In 
particular, we believe there is an account of socially embedded, temporally 
extended agency that explains why confabulation has the benefits that Bortolotti 
discusses. 
 
While we aim to build on Bortolotti’s proposal, we also take issue with some of 
the empirical support that Bortolotti cites. According to Bortolotti, confabulation 
generates the appearance of consistency among the kinds of things that might 
serve as motivating responses. It also aligns these motivating responses  with an 
individual's underlying sense of who they are and what they care about. This is 
important because on her view, the preferences that are causally relevant to 
decision-making varies considerably in virtue of unconscious or situational 
influences:  
 
Preferences may vary considerably depending on the 
circumstances, and this is also due to such preferences being 
influenced by mental processes that cannot be controlled via 
deliberation or accessed via introspection, such as priming effects, 
basic emotional reactions, and implicit biases (2018: 242). 
 
So, according to Bortolotti, confabulation is important because people's actual 
preferences are subject to a range of unconscious or situational forces (i.e. the 
priming effects, affective responses, and implicit biases mentioned above) and 
the influence of these forces cannot be “controlled via deliberation or accessed 
via introspection” (2018: 242). 
 
The evidence for these claims has, however, recently been disputed. While there 
are many studies that purportedly find evidence of the influence of unconscious 
factors on behavior, meta-analyses of these studies have revealed only small or 
domain-specific effects on overt behavior (Demaree-Cotton, 2016; Landy & 
Goodwin, 2015; Oswald et al., 2013). Thus, we lack clear empirical evidence 
about the magnitude of influence that unconscious factors have on the 
deliberative components of behavior. 
 
Beyond this failure to obtain clearly domain-general results, the research itself 
has been subject to conceptual challenges. Some researchers note that the studies 
used to support claims about unconscious influences on behavior have boundary 
conditions that greatly limit generalizability (see Mele, 2009; Miller, 2013; May, 
2018; Newell & Shanks, 2014). This reinforces our skepticism about the 
credentials of the empirical research. 
 
The extent to which unconscious factors influence people's behavior remains an 
open question. For that reason, we are hesitant to rely on it in developing a 
theory of confabulation. This empirical caution does not impugn Bortolotti’s 
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account. Our point is that this issue is largely irrelevant to the broader issue of 
confabulation's role in a properly functioning cognitive life. Confabulation 
would be beneficial even if it turned out that people's motivations were not 
subject to widespread unconscious influences inaccessible to their introspection. 
Bortolotti’s main point about confabulation's positive status can make do with 
more modest empirical claims. To see that, however, we need to first understand 
the social context of confabulation as well as the underlying picture of agency 
that gives rise to it. 
 
2. The Social Teleology of Confabulation 
In the next two subsections, we discuss two circumstances under which people 
tend to confabulate. What is common to these two circumstances is that their 
confabulatory behavior is essentially social and (arguably) rational. They thus 
serve as illustrative examples of the properly functional nature of confabulation. 
We consider the benefits of confabulating in these circumstances, like boosting 
predictability and relational resilience. 
 
2.1 The Confluence of Random Selection and Predictability 
 
Let’s return to consumer choice.6 Researchers have found that people confabulate 
reasons for their purchases. In consumer choice studies, individuals are asked to 
choose from among a set of options with no readily discernible difference 
between them. When asked to justify their selection, participants confabulate 
reasons based on quality or appearance. Why do people do this? 
 
We suggest that consumer choice cases demonstrate one species of 
confabulation, one where the confabulation is the product of an interaction 
between two processes. Each process plays a crucial role in our psychic economy 
that is largely independent of the other’s. But there are specific circumstances 
where the two collide. When they do, they produce confabulations. 
 
Define a Buridan’s Ass scenario as a scenario in which someone must decide 
between options with no readily discernible difference. For most people, such 
scenarios are a routine part of life. For instance: they routinely choose which 
pump to use at the gas station, or which box of pasta to pick up at the grocery 
store. These scenarios do not involve decisions between gas station chains or 
brands of pasta. They involve decisions between particular pumps at the same 
station and particular boxes of De Cecco (or Barilla, or whatever brand of pasta 
you might happen to favor). 
 	
6
  Studies that investigate positional effects on choice also tend to elicit confabulation (Bar-
Hillel, 2015). Hall et al. (2012) identified similar effects for political and moral opinions. 
Participants first completed surveys on their political and moral opinions. Researchers then 
reversed some answers and ask participants to explain their (now reversed) opinions. Nearly 
70% of participants defended the reversed position, even when the level of initial agreement 
tended toward the poles (i.e. strong agreement or strong disagreement). These studies and 
consumer choice studies are importantly similar: in them, people justify choices by appealing 
to reasons that do not discriminate the chosen option from other available options. 
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In these scenarios, people must make a choice – they can’t just leave empty 
handed! But it would require a lot of effort to fully evaluate every option. For 
example, it would take several minutes to measure individual boxes of pasta to 
discern a minute weight difference that might justify selecting one box over the 
others. The value provided by that slight weight difference is exceeded by the 
comparatively large value of the time spent weighing. More generally, in 
Buridan’s Ass scenarios the payoff from making the “optimal” selection is almost 
never worth the effort required to discern the relevant reasons. It would 
therefore be highly inefficient for someone to try to discern reasons that would 
rationalize their decision.  
 
In these scenarios, people typically don't care about making the “optimal” 
selection. But because they have to make a choice, people often intentionally 
routinize the choices they make in these types of scenarios. Some might, for 
example, always grab the closest box of pasta, starting from the shelf closest to 
eye level and moving from left to right, like reading a book. But people are likely 
to encounter new and unexpected Buridan’s Ass scenarios. In the absence of an 
established routine, it is beneficial – for the sake of efficiency – to have a random-
selection mechanism that tips the balance in favor of one option.7 Thankfully, 
people seem to have this (see Icard, Forthcoming). This mechanism is not 
consciously cultivated, and in fact its operations are largely invisible to the 
individual. Nevertheless, the benefits to efficiency that the mechanism provides 
establish its rationality in Buridan’s Ass scenarios.8 
 
This random-selection mechanism is the first process that underlies the species of 
confabulation exhibited most clearly in consumer choice cases studies. 
 
The second process relates to the adaptive value of predictability. For organisms 
that engage in repeated social interactions, predictability yields a variety of 
benefits (McNamara et al., 2008). One illustrative benefit of predictability is the 
promotion of specialization within social niches, a crucial factor in joint activity 
and the development of communities (Bergmüller & Taborsky, 2007). This 
specialization enables people to occupy particular roles that reinforce 
expectations about how they will behave across a variety of circumstances. 
Predictability is thus an important component of our presentation as individuals 
who are capable of productive and fruitful social engagements. Hence, there is 
adaptive value in having mechanisms that produce seemingly predictable and 
apparently non-random patterns of behavior. 	
7
  In this context, random selection need not be the activity of a mechanism, strictly speaking. 
Random selection might be the upshot of processes with certain computational properties that 
can be modeled as continuous random diffusion processes (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). For 
simplicity, though, we heuristically talk in terms of mechanisms. 
8
  In our view, the mechanism is arbitrary in that it responds to some reasons and not to others 
in a manner that is unprincipled. This mechanism thus does not exacerbate Bortolotti’s worry 
about unconscious influence undermining reasons-responsiveness. Though the selection 
mechanism exhibits a kind of arbitrariness, this arbitrariness is compatible with reasons-
responsiveness. 
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When combined, these two processes produce something unexpected. Think of 
some mundane item from the grocery store that you bought this week, just like 
you do nearly every week. Now imagine being asked why you got that specific 
item. The real answer to their question might involve some complicated and 
arbitrary computational process that underlies the operations of your reasons-
responsive mechanisms.9 But we suspect that wouldn’t be the answer you’d 
instinctively give (it certainly wouldn’t be the answer we’d give!). That kind of 
arbitrariness works against people’s desire to appear predictable in social 
environments. Hence, we find that Buridan’s Ass scenarios generate a conflict 
between the outputs of the socially beneficial mechanisms that produce the 
appearance of non-randomness and the outputs of optimally engineered 
mechanisms that mediate random choices. This conflict sometimes produces a 
confabulation. 
 
Our claim is not that confabulation guarantees the distinctive benefit of apparent 
predictability in Buridan’s Ass scenarios. Our claim, rather, is that these two 
distinct psychological processes sometimes conflict. People in these scenarios 
attempt to secure the benefits of both apparent predictability and randomized 
choice without facing the seemingly inevitable consequences of the conflict 
between the two processes. In their attempt to cover their behavior in a socially 
acceptable way, they produce confabulations. 
 
2.2 Marriage Illusions as Confabulations 
 
People in long-term, committed relationships try to support their decisions to 
maintain their relationships with marriage illusions: projected rationalizations 
that fit socially acceptable patterns of justification. These marriage illusions 
positively affect the individual’s perceptions of and attitudes toward their 
partner in a long-term committed relationship (Conley et al., 2009). We think that 
these illusions demonstrate another species of confabulation.  
 
Some studies have found that people claim that their partner is more attractive 
relative to the assessments of others (Penton-Voak et al., 2007; Swami et al., 
2007). One study found that married people tend to be unaware of any faults in 
their partner (Edmonds, 1967).10 Another study found that, with respect to 
certain interpersonal traits, partners were consistently rated by their significant 
others more positively than they rated themselves in self-assessment (Murray et 
al., 1996). And a 13-year longitudinal study found that married people tend to 
find their partner more agreeable than expected (Miller et al., 2006). These results 
indicate that individuals tend to present their choice of partner as more obvious 	
9 
More fully: reasons-responsive mechanisms are composed of computational processes that, in 
certain situations (such as these Buridan’s Ass scenarios), bias decision-making toward one 
option from a number of practically indiscriminable options. This is still the activity of a 
reasons-responsive mechanism because the output is a choice made on the basis of reasons 
(even though those reasons might not be discriminating). 
10
  This illusion also holds for LGBTQ and cohabiting heterosexual couples (Conley et al., 2009). 
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than it (in all likelihood) actually was. We acknowledge that there are important 
differences between long-term relationships and consumer choices. People don’t 
normally pick from an array of simultaneously available and indistinguishable 
partners, after all. But the selection of a romantic partner is, to a non-negligible 
degree, arbitrary. Rather than admit to this arbitrariness, people attempt to 
justify it in socially fitting ways (see Doris, 2015: 141). 
 
Marriage illusions and consumer choice rationalizations are similar insofar as 
they both are attempts to justify decisions for which the individual lacks 
discriminatory justification. But they are also importantly different. For one, 
consumer choice cases involve one-off short-term selections, whereas long-term 
relationships require an initial choice followed by persistent commitment. We 
therefore suggest that there are further reasons for confabulation in relationships 
that are not found in consumer choice.  
 
We think that marriage illusions facilitate persistence by boosting resilience. One 
study reports that positive illusions are nearly universal among individuals 
satisfied with their marriage or long-term relationship (Fowers et al., 2001). One 
such illusion concerns the probability of divorce. The likelihood of divorce shifts 
between 40% and 60% (subject to variation relative to different demographic 
factors; see Wilcox and Marquardt, 2011). However, when asked to self-assess, 
individuals consistently underrate the likelihood of their own relationship 
ending in divorce (the mean estimation is 22.6%, while the modal estimate is 0%; 
see Fowers et al., 2001). Any honest (or realistic) person should see that these 
assessments are probably ill-grounded. The fact that people nevertheless 
consistently make inaccurate self-assessments strongly suggests that their reports 
are confabulations of a sort. 
 
Both kinds of idealizations (i.e. those concerning the decision and those 
concerning the commitment) manifest a form of ignorance. But, again, they serve 
a social purpose. Marriage confabulations bolster relational resilience. Couples 
report being more in love when they idealize their partner (Miller et al., 2006). 
Relationships that indulge in a degree of positive illusion tend to be healthier 
and more satisfying in the long-run. Perhaps this is because these positive 
illusions function like performance demands that make people behave more 
positively toward their partner (Doris, 2015: 133). An individual’s idealizations of 
their partner affect their attitudes toward that partner. These attitudes in turn 
raise the likelihood of the long-term success of the relationship. The relational 
optimism behind these confabulations might protect or bolster the long-term 
stability of a relationship, particularly in difficult times. As John Doris aptly 
remarks: “…inflated optimism may help sustain a union. In the dark hours of 
domesticity, could one muster the gumption to tough it out while vividly aware 
that it’s only a coin flip the bloody toil will pay off?” (Doris, 2015: 132). Accurate, 
even near-accurate, assessments would likely fail to provide these benefits.11 	
11
  This phenomenon extends beyond cases of long-term, committed relationships. Many 
endeavors benefit from increased resilience resulting from a (potentially overinflated) sense of 
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2.3 Agency and Confabulation 
 
In Section 1.2, we suggested that Bortolotti’s claim about the beneficial role of 
confabulation could get by on more empirically modest credentials. We are now 
able to develop that suggestion more fully. In doing so, we situate our account of 
confabulation in a broader theory of socially embedded agency. This, in turn, 
explains the functional profile of confabulation and helps to unify the two 
species of confabulation we have discussed thus far. 
 
How people view themselves and present themselves to others plays an 
important role in their agency. At a minimum, their self-conception mediates the 
scope of deliberative options, the availability of certain reasons, and the relevant 
norms of rationality. The roles someone occupies, the aspirations they have, and 
the narrative details that bring these together partially underwrite the exercise of 
agency (see Velleman, 2009). 
 
What an individual's self-conception fully amounts to is an interesting question, 
but one that is beyond the scope of this paper. Roughly speaking, though, we 
think that an individual’s self-conception has two components. One component 
is descriptive, while the other is aspirational. The descriptive component 
represents the individual's view of who they currently are. The aspirational 
component represents what a person aims to become and what projects they aim 
to realize. An individual's self-concept is likely composed of many different 
kinds of psychological attitudes. But for the purposes of this paper we are 
interested in the beliefs constitutive of the descriptive component (see Murray & 
Vargas, 2020 for further discussion of the role of self-concept in agency). 
 
While people’s self-conception plays a useful role in facilitating self-
understanding and guiding behavior, it also plays a useful role in coordinating 
with others. When someone projects themselves as a certain kind of agent (e.g., 
as a teacher or as an athlete) they help others to predict how they will behave 
cross-situationally, and thereby help to form expectations about how they will 
interact with others (Chen, Chen, and Shaw, 2004; Swann & Read, 1981). 
 
When people help others to understand their behavior, they facilitate important 
forms of collaboration. Collaboration is a central feature of socially embedded 
agency. While we cannot offer a full theory here, we sketch this collaborative 
view of agency as a way of explaining the benefits we ascribe to confabulation 
(for fuller defenses of this view, see Doris, 2015; Tomasello, 2016; Velleman, 
2009). 
 
Human beings are saddled with strict limitations. Some of these derive from 
anatomy; others are psychological in kind. The precise source of these limits is 
unimportant. What is important, though, is that these strict limits stand in stark 
contrast to the lofty ambitions that many of us have. Many of life’s most 	
competence. The reason for this becomes clear when situated within our account of socially 
embedded agency in the next section. 
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meaningful pursuits and projects are too complicated to carry out alone. In order 
for people to pursue the things they care most about, then, they must collaborate 
with others as a way to compensate for their strict limitations. 
 
Collaboration is a unique kind of cooperative endeavor. Collaboration requires 
joint intentionality, where each collaborator can see the other collaborators as 
participants in the joint activity. Even further, collaborators must see how the 
others see themselves as participants in the joint activity. They would otherwise 
struggle to set others up for success (Tomasello et al., 2012). Collaboration is a 
cognitively rich enterprise that requires people to predict what their 
collaborators need and how they will respond. This complexity explains the need 
for predictability that we mentioned earlier. Collaboration works best when 
everyone acts in highly predictable ways (van Dellen et al., 2015).  
 
Collaborative ventures are typically complex tasks that unfold over time. Early in 
our evolutionary history, for instance, hunters had to collaborate for days on end 
in order to bring down a woolly mammoth (Tomasello et al., 2012). While 
modern humans undertake different projects, they face similar problems. The 
joint activity often does not serve the local (short-term) interests of all 
participants. This problem is especially prevalent when the joint activity is 
undertaken in the service of some abstract goal or ideal whose reward structures 
are non-obvious. For the collaboration to succeed, there needs to be a way to 
manage commitment over time. This need, we claim, is met through resilience. 
 
More specifically, resilience works on two fronts. For an individual, resilience 
helps to martial their own motivational resources in service of maintaining 
commitment over time. For a group of collaborators, resilience helps to increase 
the perceived commitment among them, and thereby helps to maintain a 
willingness to continue collaborating.  
 
We have argued that these collaborative ventures require predictability and 
resilience. We suggest that these goods are, in part, secured by confabulation. But 
why confabulate to secure these goods, rather than through some other, 
seemingly less dysfunctional, process? Because confabulation produces (or 
maintains) useful forms of ignorance. In Buridan’s Ass scenarios, an individual’s 
confabulation produces (or maintains) an ignorance of the arbitrariness behind 
how choices are made in situations with practically indiscriminable options. In 
marriage illusions, an individual’s confabulation produces (or maintains) an 
ignorance of the accurate (and sometimes grim) prospects for long-term 
relationship success. This ignorance is useful because other features of the 
individual's agency might otherwise undermine predictability and resilience in 
ways that threaten their ability to collaborate.12 		 	
12
  On this view, confabulation is an essentially social act because it is communicative (where the 
communication produces or maintains ignorance). This communicative element of 
confabulation distinguishes it from delusion, since delusion can occur without 
communication. We thank a reviewer for indicating this consequence of our view. 
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We think the empirical support for this role of confabulation is more secure than 
the empirical support for the roles mentioned by Bortolotti. Unconscious 
influences on people's decisions may undermine their sense of agency, though 
the evidence on this matter is unclear.13 The question is far from settled., In 
contrast, collaboration is undoubtedly a central element of social agency. In 
outlining the role of confabulation in collaboration, we provide better empirical 
support for the claim that confabulation is a product of a properly functioning 
psychology. We do not deny that there is empirical support for Bortolotti’s claim 
that there is psychological value to having a coherent and largely positive 
conception of the self. In fact, we are inclined to think that there is. However, this 
claim does not differentiate Bortolotti’s account of confabulation from the one 
that we develop below because our account can also explain why such a 
conception would be psychologically valuable. 
 
As we noted earlier, there are adaptive benefits to randomness. People are 
limited, and in particular people are limited in their capacity for self-control. 
Localized instances of randomness generate the appearance of unpredictability. In 
these situations, people preserve their overall, global, sense of predictability 
through confabulation. Such confabulation generates ignorance that can boost 
resilience and thereby counteract the negative effects of limited self-control, like 
the appearance of unpredictability. 
 
There are also good reasons to engineer a highly predictable system with the 
capacity for long-term commitment. Without predictability and long-term 
commitment, it would be difficult to engage in different kinds of collaborative 
projects. That being said, there are good reasons to engineer an unpredictable 
system with limited self-control.14 To get the best of both worlds, human beings 
need a system that can strategically produce ignorance about many of the facts 
that describe them. This need brings to light the precise sense in which 
confabulation is rational. Confabulation, considered globally, is expected to help 
satisfy more of our rational desires than alternative, non-confabulatory, 
behaviors. Confabulation is instrumentally rational because of the demands of 
socially embedded and temporally extended agency.15 	
13
  There is some evidence that people take consciousness to be necessary for free agency, 
though this research does not distinguish between free agency requiring some form of 
consciousness and particular exercises of free agency requiring conscious mental activity in its 
immediate proximal etiology (Shepherd, 2015). Other evidence suggests that people easily 
confuse unconscious motivational factors with mechanistic causes of action (where 
mechanism is incompatible with agency; see De Brigard, Mandelbaum, & Ripley, 2009). Thus, 
there appears to be no conclusive evidence for or against the claim that knowledge of the 
widespread influence of unconscious processes on decision-making would undermine 
individual sense of agency. 
14
  To note just two examples of the benefit of unpredictability: (1) it is beneficial to be 
unpredictable when engaging in predator avoidance (See Richardson et al., 2018) and (2) it is 
beneficial to be unpredictable when engaging in creative thinking (Beaty et al., 2016). 
15
  Our claim about the rationality of confabulation is similar to Bratman’s external sense of 
rationality in intentional action (Bratman, 1987: 43). From the external view, intentional action 
		 17	
 
We have used consumer choice cases and marriage cases to illuminate the 
functional role of confabulation. We have focused on consumer choice cases in 
particular because of the role these cases have played in the empirical study of 
non-clinical confabulation.  But are these cases generalizable? If they are not, then 
our theory of confabulation has limited explanatory value.	
 
Issues about generalizability are difficult to settle from the armchair. People 
certainly seem to encounter such cases from time to time.  But (1) whether they 
encounter them frequently or infrequently and (2) whether they encounter them 
in a broad range of contexts or only in highly specific ones are empirical issues 
we cannot settle at this moment. However, we think that our explanation of 
consumer choice cases provides a model for understanding the role of 
confabulation in how people navigate Buridan’s Ass scenarios. 
 
Similarly, our explanation of marriage cases might seem of limited utility. After 
all, how many endeavors share the motivational perils of marriage? 		
On reflection, though, marriage cases might be more generalizable than 
Buridan’s Ass scenarios. Many long-term commitments, especially those that are 
greatly valued, are such that we are tempted to abandon them from time to time. 
This raises a problem of how we can form rational commitments in light of the 
real possibility of temptation and back-sliding (see Marušić, 2015). In short, we 
think that confabulation is an important mechanism for shielding individuals 
from the evidence that might undermine the possibility of rational long-term 
commitment in epistemically respectable ways. The full story of how this works 
is undoubtedly more complex. However, this at least suggests that many long-
term commitments (and not just marriages) rely on confabulation to preserve the 
rationality of persisting in them over time. Thus, marriage cases provide a useful 
model for understanding how confabulation works in various temporally 
extended endeavors. To name just a few intriguing comparisons: resolving to 
quit smoking, committing to a financial savings plan, dieting, or learning to play 
a musical instrument. 
 
By understanding confabulation as a process that contributes to socially 
embedded agency, we can gain a better sense of the benefits that confabulation 
aims to confer. This understanding also reveals the central role of producing 
ignorance that defines the functional profile of confabulation. In the next section, 
we elaborate on this idea further and more precisely state what confabulation is. 
 
3. Confabulation as a Manifestation of Willful Ignorance 
 	
is rational when and only when such action contributes to the satisfaction of rational desires. 
The rationality of desires is a more complicated issue that goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
We note briefly our preference for accounts of rational desire that state explain the rationality 
of desire in terms of how well grounded the desire is in appropriate experiences of the 
desirability characteristics of some state of affairs that forms part of the object of the desire 
(Audi, 1985). 
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Thus far, we have discussed a few of the circumstances under which people will 
non-dysfunctionally confabulate as well as the benefits that they stand to gain by 
doing so. In this section, we provide a more fully developed and more general 
account of confabulation. Confabulation, we argue, is best understood as a 
manifestation of willful ignorance. By understanding confabulation in this way, 
we can accomplish five theoretically significant tasks. First, we can make sense of 
the role that confabulation plays in collaborative agency. Second, we can explain 
the varieties of non-clinical confabulations. Third, we can articulate the 
differences between clinical and non-clinical confabulation while preserving its 
unity as a psychological phenomenon. Fourth, we can justify the ways in which 
confabulation can be rational. Finally, we can make testable predictions 
regarding the conditions under which we can expect people to confabulate. 
 
3.1 The Willful Ignorance Framework 
 
Let’s begin by considering some curious empirical results. Surprisingly, people 
can be pushed to back off from their marriage confabulations. In one study, 
Solomon and Vazire (2014) found that individuals in romantic relationships 
inflate the attractiveness of their partner relative to the assessments of others, but 
that they also accurately report their partner’s reputation for attractiveness (cf. 
Doris, 2015: 133). It seems, then, that marriage confabulators are not completely 
blind to the justificatory status of their confabulations. Solomon and Vazire 
speculate that people internalize both their own assessments and the assessments 
of others. When prompted, people can bring the latter to mind, and thereby 
tacitly acknowledge that their own assessments are inflated. Plausibly, then, 
confabulations like those found in marriage illusions result from the suppression 
of known, accessible information.  
 
If that is the right read of the situation, then it appears that confabulation 
manifests a kind of willful ignorance.16 Suppose that S states that p, where this 
statement is a confabulation. S’s stating that p manifests willful ignorance when: 
(1) The statement is not based on a suitably large number of members in the 
information set {I} possessed by S, and 
(2) It is the case that if S were to access a suitably large number of members in 
{I}, S would not state that p, and 
(3) S fails to access members in {I} because the information is detrimental to 
realizing S's commitments, goal, and cares. 
 
Condition (1) captures the fact that confabulating manifests ignorance. Condition 
(2) captures the fact that the ignorance is motivationally efficacious. And 
Condition (3) captures the fact that the ignorance is willful. We turn now to a 	
16
  Sometimes, willful ignorance is the result of a deliberate failure to acquire evidence (for 
instance, the suspicious spouse might be willfully ignorant of her partner’s infidelity because 
she deliberately avoids checking her spouse's phone for evidence). The kind of willful 
ignorance manifested in confabulation is not like this. As we'll discuss below, the kind of 
willful ignorance manifested in confabulation is the result of a deliberate failure to access 
information that is either known or easily inferred given what is already known. 
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more explicit discussion of what the will is and how it relates to the willful 
ignorance manifested in confabulation.  
 
An individual’s will is a hierarchically-organized capacity structured by what the 
individual cares about. These cares establish volitional constraints that define an 
individual’s limits of practical deliberation, including what they take to be 
potential reasons for action (Frankfurt, 1989). The volitional constraints in turn 
make certain options or commitments unthinkable (see Frankfurt, 1988). 
 
The structure of an individual's volitional hierarchy sensitizes them to certain 
considerations and desensitizes them to others. As the structure becomes more 
entrenched (or central to the individual's identity) this sensitization might result 
in blindness to certain sets of considerations. For example, an individual's deeply 
entrenched care and commitment toward their family might set a volitional 
constraint such that they cannot even deliberate about the possibility of 
betraying their siblings for a trivial sum of money. Additionally, in the context of 
a long-term relationship, care and commitment toward their partner might make 
infidelity unthinkable. These structures provide an architecture for practical 
reasoning and deliberation that frames certain options as open while leaving 
other options out entirely. 
 
The kind of willful ignorance manifested in confabulation is the result of a 
deliberate failure to access accessible information that is either known or easily 
inferred given what is already known.17 The failure, however, is rooted in the 
individual's volitional structure insofar as the failure is in service of maintaining 
a commitment, goal, concern, or other volitional element. This willful element is 
crucial; without it, we would struggle to distinguish a confabulation from an 
unwittingly false statement. 		
As we understand it, deliberate unawareness is not intentional. We do not think 
that someone prone to marriage confabulations first has in mind a body of 
accurate relationship information and then forms an intention to ignore it. 
Rather, that individual’s cares and commitments shape volitional constraints that 
form the background conditions for their subsequent confabulations.18  
 	
17
  This formulation might seem paradoxical. How can information that is practically 
unthinkable be accessible? While the information is unthinkable relative to the current 
context, this does not rule out the possibility of the information being accessed in a different 
context. Evidence that this kind of information is available comes from Solomon & Vazire’s 
(2014) study, where people were able to back off of their confabulations in certain contexts. 
18
  While our account borrows heavily from Frankfurt’s conception of the will, it does not 
depend on his being the correct account of the will. We think that these structures (cares, goals, 
commitments, volitional constraints, etc.) are typical of human psychology. The relationship 
between these structures and confabulation is independent of whether the concept of the will can 
be fully analyzed in terms of these structures. This brings out the close relationship between our 
account and other motivational accounts of confabulation (Sullivan-Bissett, 2015; Coltheart, 2017). 
Our account adds to these an underlying notion of agency that supplies a framework for thinking 
about the functional role of non-clinical confabulation. 
		20	
Understanding these volitional constraints is crucial for understanding deliberate 
unawareness. An individual’s will is a capacity structured by the hierarchy of 
their cares, concerns, and commitments. These cares establish volitional 
constraints that define the individual’s limits of practical deliberation, including 
what they take to be potential reasons for action (Frankfurt, 1989). These 
volitional constraints make certain options or commitments unthinkable (see 
Frankfurt, 1988).		
Now that we've discussed the general connection between the will and 
confabulation, we will briefly discuss how it manifests in our paradigmatic cases 
of properly functional confabulation.		
People typically care about their relationships, especially their long-term, 
committed relationships. These relationship-directed cares set volitional 
constraints that make certain considerations typically unthinkable – for example, 
that their partner is not attractive. In some contexts, the set of available 
considerations may include only considerations the awareness of which would 
fundamentally disrupt the long-term health of the relationship. As a result, 
people might exclude information about their partner that is, in reality, both 
relevant and accurately representative. 
 
Importantly, though, this is not a merely incidental fact about marriage illusions. 
While the benefits gained (e.g., relational resilience) might be peculiar to 
marriage illusion confabulation, the same psychological framework can be used 
to explain other species of properly functional confabulation. Consider 
confabulation in Buridan's Ass scenarios. As we explained in Section 2.3, people 
care about presenting themselves as predictable because it facilitates 
collaborative ventures. Consequently, people willfully ignore information about 
the randomness that underlies some of their more mundane choices. Again, we 
expect there to be some interesting differences across these circumstances in 
precisely how and why confabulation occurs. But they remain unified by their 
shared overall function – namely, as contributing toward maintaining the kind of 
willful ignorance necessary for the acquisition of practical goods inherent to 
socially embedded agency. 
 
3.2 Applying the Willful Ignorance Framework 
 
People can, in the right setting, back off from their confabulations. This fact 
might seem to suggest that confabulation is an intentional activity where people 
decide when and where they want to confabulate. But confabulation is not an 
intentional activity. If confabulation were intentional, it would be difficult to 
distinguish it from lying. Nevertheless, confabulation does have the appearance 
of intentional activity (cf. Fotopoulou, 2009). We think that any adequately 
developed theory of confabulation must explain this appearance while 
simultaneously preserving confabulation's status as a non-intentional activity. 
 
The Willful Ignorance Framework provides just such an explanation. The 
framework characterizes confabulation as a manifestation of a kind of willful 
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ignorance. As we explained above, willful ignorance results from an individual's 
volitional constraints. People never intentionally act to set their volitional 
constraints. Volitional constraints set the boundaries for deliberation. Because 
they are the grounds of choice making, they are not the targets of our choices. An 
individual can, of course, deliberate about their cares or commitments. But the 
end result of such a deliberation is not the formation of an intention. When an 
individual revises their final ends, they are doing something other than revising 
their intentions (see Richardson, 1994 for further discussion). While the resulting 
unawareness is not intentional, because it is shaped by the individual's will (i.e. 
the current structure of their cares) – the unawareness is deliberate. 
 
So why does confabulation appear to be intentional? Solomon and Vazire’s (2014) 
results show that willful ignorance is susceptible to calibration. In calibration, an 
individual experiences a shift in their volitional constraints that result from a 
reorganization of their volitional hierarchy that is itself based on a change in the 
available reasons or the balance of the individual's values. There are some 
considerations that people are normally blind to because those considerations 
negatively bear on the relationships that they care about.19 But their care for the 
relationship can be temporarily eclipsed by other cares. For example, when a 
researcher prods an individual to assess the reputation of their partner 
(especially in private, anonymous contexts), that individual’s care for productive 
social engagement can momentarily eclipse their care for the relationship. As a 
result, that individual accesses information that accurately represents their 
partner. The fact that willful ignorance can be calibrated explains why an 
individual can be induced to make accurate reports rather than confabulate, even 
though this change in behavior is not the result of anything intentional.20  	
19
  Some examples suffice to bring this out. We’ve touched on how this kind of blindness affects 
long-term romantic relationships. But such blindness might also affect particular religious 
communities that include members who have done terrible things (e.g. the sexual abuse 
scandal in the Catholic Church). Commitment to the community might generate blindness to 
these occurrences as a way to maintain the commitment. Similarly, sports fans, in order to 
continue enjoying their sport, might blind themselves to unfair labor practices or player safety 
concerns. Fans of American football, for example, might blind themselves to the dangers of 
head trauma and CTE that have recently been linked to the sport. 
20
  Two additional pieces of evidence support the claim that confabulation can be calibrated 
(and, hence, that the difference between clinical and non-clinical confabulation is the possibility 
of calibration). First, spontaneous clinical confabulation is associated with executive dysfunction, 
particularly with damage to the ventromedial frontal cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex (Gilboa 
et al., 2006; Turner et al., 2008). These regions also subserve various cognitive control processes 
like salience processing (Boorman, Rushworth, & Behrens, 2013). The associations between 
spontaneous confabulation and cognitive control (and the lack of cognitive control) salience 
provide one reason to believe that confabulating requires a failure of control that manifests a 
form of ignorance. Second, some mechanistic models of confabulation posit that confabulation 
partially results from a failure to monitor and suppress thoughts with false or ill-grounded 
contents (Johnson & Raye, 2000; Turner & Coltheart, 2010). These monitoring and inhibitory 
components are also constituents of self-control and cognitive control that ground capacities to 
act deliberately and intentionally (see Davisson & Hoyle, 2017). These failures of control, 
however, can be modulated by the agent’s personal-level concerns, values, and plans (Kool, 
Shenhav, & Botvinick, 2017). This empirical evidence is useful for understanding the possibility, 
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Calibration's role in non-clinical confabulation further highlights the agential 
aspects of confabulation. Our understanding of confabulation as a complex 
manifestation of agency helps to explain the way that the multiple realizability of 
confabulation coheres with the available empirical evidence regarding the many 
putative causes of confabulation. Some researchers highlight how confabulation 
results from lack of affective guidance in source monitoring and retrieval of 
memories (Hirstein, 2005: 180). Without the correct emotional constraints, people 
cannot adequately respond to social information. They might, as a result, 
confabulate. Other researchers note that confabulation can result from people’s 
desires to fill gaps in memory, their desires to construct coherent self-narratives, 
or simply their desires to project their own wishful thinking (Fotopoulou, 2009). 
The Willful Ignorance Framework readily incorporates these psychological 
factors. The structure of an individual's volitional hierarchy partly determines 
their motivations, and emotions help to regulate thought and action in light of 
this hierarchy. 
 
There are several implications here worth mentioning. First, our understanding 
of confabulation suggests that there is no unique neurological basis of 
confabulation and, hence, no single (or informatively unitary) cause of 
confabulation.21	The multiple realizability of confabulation coheres with the 
available evidence regarding the numerous putative causes of confabulation. 
Some researchers highlight how confabulation results from lack of affective 
guidance in source monitoring and retrieval of memories (Hirstein, 2005: 180). 
Without the correct emotional constraint, people cannot adequately respond to 
social information. They might, as a result, confabulate. Others note that 
confabulation can result from people’s desires to fill gaps in memory, their 
desires to construct coherent self-narratives, or simply their desires to project 
their own wishful thinking (Fotopoulou, 2009). Our framework incorporates both 
psychological factors. The structure of an individual's volitional hierarchy partly 
determines their motivations, and emotions help to regulate thought and action 
in light of this hierarchy.		
Second, our understanding of confabulation suggests that clinical confabulation 
manifests a breakdown of agency. Despite this breakdown of agency, we can still 
understand confabulation in terms of the teleological aims of paradigmatic non-
clinical confabulation (we will return to this point later). The Willful Ignorance 
Framework makes this clear by supporting the following principled distinction. 
Non-clinical confabulation is a manifestation of a properly functioning 
psychology. Clinical confabulation, on the other hand, provides a window into 
an individual psychology that is in some way defective. Importantly, these 
defects need not be traceable to any particular psychological process or structure; 	
which we discuss more below, that the difference between clinical and non-clinical confabulation 
consists in calibration. 
21
  The qualification is meant to acknowledge that there might be some abstract categorization 
that unifies all relevant neurobiological substrates of confabulation. However, the level of 
abstraction might be so high as to make the corresponding category uninformatively vague 
(see Klein, 2012).  
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clinical confabulation might result from an overly rigid volitional hierarchy or an 
insensitivity to changing social information, both of which are psychologically 
holistic features. This division also explains the fact that non-clinical 
confabulation is sometimes difficult to detect but clinical confabulation is 
typically obvious (Chrobak & Zaragova, 2009). In non-clinical settings people 
tend to produce confabulations that fit an acceptable pattern of reasons and 
justifications (Coltheart & Turner, 2009: 185-86; Wheatley, 2009: 209-10). But, in 
clinical settings, people tend to produce confabulations that fail to exhibit 
sensitivity to shifts in patterns of reasons, and therefore fail to justify their 
statements. Similarly, in non-clinical settings, people are typically able to 
withdraw previous confabulations or to withhold from confabulating altogether. 
Clinical confabulators are typically unable to do so. As a result, non-clinical 
confabulation often raises fewer red flags. 
 
Someone might take this characterization to suggest that what separates clinical 
from non-clinical confabulation is the complete absence of the ability to calibrate. 
We think that’s too strong. Evidence suggests that clinical confabulators can back 
off from their confabulations, albeit only with great difficulty and very briefly (cf. 
Gassell & Williams, 1963; Mattioli et al., 1999). Hence, we propose that 
confabulation is a continuum. Toward one end of the continuum are 
confabulations that are agency-enhancing, including paradigmatic non-clinical 
confabulations like marriage illusions. Toward the other end are confabulations 
that reveal a defective sense of agency and a complete inability to calibrate, 
including paradigmatic clinical confabulations like those produced by Capgras 
patients. What marks a confabulation’s position along the continuum is the 
extent to which it reveals the ability to calibrate. At one extreme is a perfectly 
fluid capacity for calibration, while the other extreme reflects a total deficiency in 
calibrating. 
 
The Willful Ignorance Framework is compatible with other accounts of 
confabulation. Consider, for example, mnemonic theories of confabulation that 
focus on false memory reports and the mechanisms that underlie these reports 
(Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Schnider et al., 2000). Such theories are compatible 
with our framework because the mechanisms they implicate can be interpreted 
as manifesting different kinds of willful ignorance. Causal theories of 
confabulation define mnemonic confabulation in terms of an individual's 
seeming to remember that p failing to be causally related to some past 
representation of its being the case that p (see Bernecker, 2017; Robins, 2016). On 
the Willful Ignorance Framework, the past representation of it being the case that 
p might be one of (if not the only) item in the relevant informational set that the 
individual fails to access in confabulating.22 The Willful Ignorance Framework is 
also compatible with process-based account of confabulation (see Robins 2020; 	
22
  Sometimes, a confabulating individual might report its being the case that p where it was 
never the case that p. In this case, it’s not simply that the past representation does not play the 
right causal role in producing the state of remembering; rather, there is no such thing that 
could play this sort of causal role. However, it might still be the case that the individual is 
confabulating, because its not being the case that p might be easily inferred from other 
information accessible to the individual. 
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Michaelin, 2016). Being willfully ignorant of some information is a process that is 
causally relevant to producing confabulation. This marks a point of agreement 
between the Willful Ignorance Framework and accounts of confabulation that 
focus on mnemonic confabulation. 
 
Finally, because confabulation partly results from willful ignorance, an 
individual confabulation can be more or less rational in virtue of the aptness of 
the confabulation relative to the volitional hierarchy of the confabulator and the 
available reasons. We thus offer the following schema for rational assessment: an 
agent produces a confabulation that is rational relative to their volitional 
constraints if and only if the confabulation supports responding to or ignoring 
considerations in ways that conform to the volitional hierarchy at the time the 
agent produces the confabulation. In this way, the rationality of confabulation is 
congruent with reasons-based accounts of justification and rationality (cf. 
Scanlon, 1998: 22-25). With this formulation of the rationality of confabulation, 
we can explain why confabulation is subject to normative assessment even 
though it is not an intentional action. We can also explain the sense in which 
clinical confabulation usually seems to be irrational: such confabulations 
typically fail to cohere with the individual’s volitional constraints.23When an 
amputee confabulates that the obviously lost limb is still there, it is hard to 
reconcile that confabulation with what the amputee cares most about. In contrast, 
when a husband confabulates about the unmatched desirability of his wife, that 
confabulation (typically, though not always) fits quite nicely with what the 
husband cares most about. 
 
The Willful Ignorance Framework also makes some empirical predictions about 
the conditions under which people are likely to confabulate. As we suggested 
earlier, people are more likely to confabulate in contexts where they care about 
what they’re doing. This reality makes confabulation tricky to test in 
experimental settings (especially since our view accounts for the desire to appear 
predictable to others). However, one experimental possibility is to manipulate 
whether statements are made publicly or anonymously. This manipulation 
should significantly modulate rates of confabulation (controlling for perceived 
importance of the statement topic). For example, one possibility would be to 
collect first- and third-party assessments on the likelihood of sticking to a 
training program from people who recently signed up to complete a marathon. 
Our account makes two predictions: (1) there should be a small but significant 
effect of anonymity, and (2) the effect of anonymity will be greater for those who 
rate completing the marathon as more important relative to those who rate it as 
less important. This is because care positively correlates with the likelihood of 
confabulating. Anonymity mitigates the urge to confabulate, so anonymity 
should reduce the frequency of confabulation. Thus, individuals who don’t care 	
23
  Clinical confabulations can help protect meaningful components of an individual’s self-
conception (Gunn & Bortolotti, 2018) and compensate for the individual’s compromised 
reputational capital (Bortolotti, 2018). Nevertheless, confabulation that approaches paradigmatic 
clinical confabulation likely fails to achieve the social benefits of paradigmatic non-clinical 
confabulation. 
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much about the marathon should respond more or less the same with respect to 
predicting commitment, whereas people who do care should respond differently 
under conditions of anonymity. This indicates how experimenters might apply 
this account to the empirical study of confabulation outside of clinical settings 
(and outside the context of long-term committed relationships). 	
 
3.3 A Summary of Our Account 
 
Let’s first consider what confabulation isn’t on our account. Confabulation is not 
intentional deception (see Hirstein, 2005: 28; Sullivan-Bissett, 2015: 553). In fact, 
confabulation isn’t intentional at all. Confabulation is not a deficiency of human 
psychology. And while confabulation sometimes takes the form of a false 
memory report, this by no means exhausts the various forms that it can take. 
 
Confabulation arises in virtue of people's volitional constraints. Confabulation 
manifests a kind of willful ignorance characterized by its unique explanatory and 
motivational aims. But confabulation is not inherently dysfunctional; 
paradigmatic non-clinical confabulation manifests a complex exercise of social 
agency. For example, confabulation often promotes the goods of predictability 
and resilience by generating a distinctive form of ignorance in the confabulator 
and their “audience”. 
 
There can be dysfunctional forms of confabulation. Some of these may constitute 
clinical forms of confabulation. We believe that clinical confabulation occurs 
when the individual has difficulty exercising their ability to calibrate their 
behavior in light of their volitional hierarchy. The ensuing confabulations can 
indeed be worrying and worth treating. But they are instances of the same kind 
of psychological phenomenon that is found in more mundane confabulations, 
like those examined in consumer choice studies. It is only because of the 
historical focus on clinical confabulation that such cases were taken as 
paradigmatic of the phenomenon in general. According to the framework that 
we have developed, the order of explanation should go in the other direction. 
Dysfunctional clinical cases should be understood as cases where an otherwise 
properly functioning confabulatory psychology goes awry. 
 
One final challenge for the Willful Ignorance Framework is that it appears to 
make all non-clinical confabulations instances of self-deception.24 But we think 
that the two can be distinguished in the following way. When someone 
confabulates with respect to p they must be confident that p. It is possible, 
however, for someone to be self-deceived with respect to p and not be confident 
that p. Confidence is thus one distinguishing feature between self-deception and 
confabulation (cf. Hirstein, 2005: 214). Furthermore, self-deception is sometimes 
intentional, whereas confabulation is never intentional (cf. Hirstein, 2005: 214-15). 
	
24
  Admittedly, some might not see this as a problem. Hirstein (2005: 226) thinks that an 
individual self-deceived about whether p (and who confidently and wholeheartedly believes 
that p) who asserts that p is confabulating. 
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So, while we admit that confabulation and self-deception share key features, they 
are nonetheless distinct constructs.  
 
Recall Hirstein’s epistemic theory, which states that S confabulates that p if and 
only if: 
 
1. S claims that p; 
2. S believes that p; 
3. S’s thought that p is ill-grounded; 
4. S does not know that their thought that p is ill-grounded; 
5. S should know that their thought that p is ill-grounded; 
6. S is confident that p. 
 
We’ve argued that confabulation is a manifestation of a kind of willful ignorance. 
This idea conflicts with two aspects of Hirstein’s account, namely conditions (4) 
and (5). Confabulators, in certain circumstances, seem to know (or seem to be in 
a position to know) that their confabulations are ill-grounded. So, condition (4) is 
at best misleading. Furthermore, condition (5), when applied to cases of non-
clinical confabulation, is either trivial or false – depending on how we 
understand ‘should’. If we understand ‘should’ in the all-things-considered 
sense, then condition (5) is false. As we argued above, there are practical reasons 
that justify confabulating on particular occasions, and the balance of those 
reasons might provide decisive reason for an agent to confabulate. If we 
understand ‘should’ in the epistemic sense, then condition (5) is trivial. There are 
a number of things that agents like us should do from the epistemic perspective. 
But we regularly fail to live up to these epistemic demands for practical reasons. 
For example, we should, epistemically, be Bayesians with respect to belief 
revision and updating. But our cognitive limitations and the demands for 
efficiency tend to outweigh these epistemic considerations. Perhaps people 
should, epistemically, know that their thoughts are ill-grounded on some 
occasions of confabulating. But, given the practical reasons in favor of 
confabulating, we might fail to live up to these epistemic demands or find them 
outweighed by other consideration. 
 
In light of these considerations, we offer the following two-factor epistemic 
definition. S confabulates that p if and only if: 
 
1. S claims that p; 
2. S believes that p; 
3. S’s thought that p is ill-grounded; 
4. S willfully ignores the fact that the thought that p is ill-grounded; 
5. S is confident that p. 
 
This definition counts as a two-factor theory because two factors are primarily 
responsible for confabulation: the process that produces the ill-grounded thought 
and the processes that are implicated in willful ignorance. The thoughts that are 
produced are ill-grounded because they fail to have appropriate epistemic 
justification. But, so long as confabulation exhibits appropriate reasons-
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responsiveness, the ill-groundedness of the expressed thought does not preclude 
the confabulation from being rational.  
 
Our definition blends elements from Hirstein, Coltheart, Sullivan-Bissett, and 
Bortolotti’s views on confabulation. It borrows from Hirstein the skeleton of an 
epistemic theory. But it adapts it to better incorporate Bortolotti, Sullivan-Bissett, 
and Coltheart’s idea that the core of confabulation consists in its teleological 
aims. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we presented a novel account of confabulation that focuses on the 
role confabulation plays in the lives of social creatures living under constraints of 
bounded rationality. While some instances of confabulation seem strange or 
dysfunctional, on the whole confabulation is an adaptive process that results 
from a conflict between things that matter to the individual confabulating. 
Confabulation, on this view, manifests a kind of willful ignorance. Confabulation 
is thus connected to other reasons-based accounts of rationality. In this way, our 
account makes sense of the fact that confabulation can sometimes be rational or 
beneficial. We also offered a principled division between clinical and non-clinical 
cases of confabulation, drawn in terms of whether or not the individual’s 
confabulating behavior is sensitive to both the individual’s cares and the 
available practical reasons that justify confabulating. 
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